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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION FROM JOHN 
LILBURNE TO OLLIE NORTH 
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.* 
In the 200th anniversary year of the Constitution, inadequate 
attention was paid to the turbulent history and current application 
of the fifth amendment privilege that no person "shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " This 
ecumenical provision has been invoked over the years by such dif-
fering groups as the Communists and their fellow travellers and 
dupes, Iran-Contra superpatriots, crooked business and government 
leaders, and almost anyone else caught up in the tolls of the law. 
Yet, even the diversity of those benefitting from the privilege and its 
ancient and honorable roots have too often failed, in periods of do-
mestic stress, to persuade judges of its importance. A little history 
of this much maligned and often ignored constitutional provision 
might be both timely and useful. 
Some historians trace the prohibition against self-incrimination 
all the way back to Magna Carta. Although largely a struggle be-
tween King John and the English barons, Magna Carta contained 
this lofty if somewhat vague provision: "No free man shall be taken 
or imprisoned or dispossessed . . . except by the legal judgment of 
his peers or by the law of the land." But more commonly the privi-
lege against self-incrimination is traced back to the seventeenth-
century Leveller Movement and its hero Freeborn John Lilburne. 
Following a trip to Holland in 1637, Lilburne was arrested on 
suspicion of importing "factious and scandalous books" into Eng-
land. When the authorities and the Star Chamber tried to interro-
gate him, he asserted what he claimed with more certainty than 
precedent was the right of a freeborn Englishman not to accuse 
himself. Whippings, the pillory, imprisonment, massive fines could 
neither force answers from his lips nor silence his eloquence against 
"crimination." He finally was vindicated and released from prison 
at the direction of the Long Parliament; his role as national hero 
was confirmed by a substantial indemnity ordered by the House of 
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Lords. As Dean Erwin N. Griswold made clear in his bold and 
brilliant tract in the 1950s, "[T]his event seems to have been enough 
to establish the privilege against self-incrimination as a part of the 
common law ... and [it] came to this continent as a part of the legal 
heritage of our early settlers." When the demand for a Bill of 
Rights arose with the drafting and ratification of the Constitution 
two centuries ago, the privilege against self-incrimination was in-
cluded in the fifth amendment, thus buttressing the presumption of 
innocence and placing the burden of proving guilt upon the govern-
ment. But the privilege's inclusion in the Constitution was more 
tranquil than its life since. 
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, like 
the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was of course only appli-
cable against the new federal government. Even after the Supreme 
Court began interpreting the fourteenth amendment's "due pro-
cess" clause as incorporating substantial segments of the Bill of 
Rights like the first amendment, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was not given that lofty status. As late as 1937, Justice Benja-
min N. Cardozo, certainly one of the greatest and most liberal 
judges in our entire legal history, found the privilege not "so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental. . . . Indeed, today as in the past there are students of 
our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief ... and 
who would limit its scope, or destroy it altogether." I was Justice 
Cardozo's law clerk at the time; the only defense I can make fifty 
years later is a combination of hero worship and my own plea of 
self-incrimination. It was not until 1964 that the privilege became 
binding upon the states. 
Likely the worst storm to engulf the fifth amendment came in 
the wake of World War II with the anti-Communist hysteria that 
followed the nation's disillusionment with its Soviet wartime ally. 
The House un-American Activities Committee ("HUAC") set its 
sights on exposing to public view Communists and their fellow 
travellers in all walks of life. One of HUAC's first targets was the 
motion picture industry. The Committee subpoenaed ten screen-
writers, promptly dubbed the Hollywood 10, who balked at answer-
ing questions about Communist affiliations. Recognizing the public 
hostility to a plea of self-incrimination, the Hollywood 10 based 
their refusal upon the rights of silence and privacy of thought which 
they extrapolated from the first amendment. The lower courts, 
however, rejected these contentions and the Vinson Supreme Court 
refused to review the case. 
The jail terms served by John Howard Lawson, Dalton 
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Trumbo and their associates would almost certainly have been 
avoided by a timely plea of self-incrimination. The same year that 
the Supreme Court refused to review the Hollywood lO's unsuccess-
ful reliance upon the first amendment (1950), the Court upheld the 
plea of self-incrimination against questioning concerning Commu-
nist activities or affiliations when the witness's answers "would have 
furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution ... 
for violation of (or conspiracy to violate) the Smith Act." 
These actions of the Supreme Court forced reliance upon the 
fifth rather than the first amendment where a congressional com-
mittee witness was unwilling to reveal Communist ideology or affili-
ations. The consequences extended far beyond the imprisonment of 
the Hollywood 10. Communist-hunters, with the late recruit Sena-
tor Joseph McCarthy leading the charge (he joined the pack in 
1950), labelled those who invoked the privilege "Fifth Amendment 
Communists." For at least a large segment of the public, the plea of 
self-incrimination turned into an admission of Communist ideology 
or even subversion. The congressional investigating committees 
wanted little more from the witnesses before them than pleas of the 
fifth amendment; even when a witness made clear in executive ses-
sion or otherwise that he would plead the privilege rather than fur-
nish information, the committee would hold a public session to 
expose him as a "Fifth Amendment Communist." 
There were, of course, reasons why a witness might plead the 
fifth amendment that were both nonincriminating and honorable. 
Playwright Lillian Hellman asked me to represent her when she re-
ceived a subpoena from HUAC in 1952. She told me that she was 
quite willing to tell all about her own political affiliations and activi-
ties. She hated the idea of pleading the fifth amendment. But she 
also said she was unwilling to testify concerning the affiliations and 
activities of others, and she did not think she was the kind of person 
who could serve a prison sentence. This created a considerable 
legal dilemma not only for Miss Hellman, but for many like her 
who were willing to testify about themselves but unwilling to "name 
names" or invite a jail term. 
The reason for her dilemma was a Supreme Court ruling that a 
person who tells about, and thus incriminates, herself "waives" the 
privilege in various ways, including testifying about others. Thus, if 
Miss Hellman testified about herself, she could not invoke the privi-
lege as to others and would be faced with the unacceptable alterna-
tives of naming names or a prison sentence. In this situation, Miss 
Hellman wrote HUAC that she had "nothing to hide from your 
Committee" and was willing to testify before the Committee "as to 
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my own opinions and my own actions .... " Since this would waive 
her privilege against self-incrimination (a privilege she legally had), 
she asked HUAC to agree not to force her to answer questions 
about others. "I cannot and will not," she wrote, "cut my con-
science to fit this year's fashions . . . . " The Committee haughtily 
rejected the proposal. While Miss Hellman was pleading the fifth 
amendment, the press was reading the letter we distributed in the 
Committee room. Miss Hellman and I had agreed that victory or 
defeat would be measured by whether the headlines the next day 
pitched the story on her refusal to name names or her plea of the 
fifth amendment. We won! 
A much easier client was playwright Arthur Miller, who re-
ceived his HUAC subpoena four years later, apparently because the 
Committee thought a little Marilyn Monroe publicity would not 
hurt. (Miller and Monroe were engaged at the time.) Rejecting any 
fifth amendment plea, Mr. Miller testified all about his own activi-
ties and then bluntly refused to name names, thus inviting the in-
dictment for contempt of Congress which followed in due course. 
Arthur Miller had a perfect first amendment case; the Commit-
tee asked him all about his past beliefs, expressions, and associa-
tions; interrogated him in detail about his plays; and went so far as 
to question him repeatedly about his criticisms of HUAC. But the 
court of appeals, ducking the first amendment issue, found a techni-
cal defect in the Committee's procedures as a reason for acquitting 
Mr. Miller. So his truly noble effort to vindicate first amendment 
rights in the face of the Hollywood 10 defeat went by the boards. 
I participated in one more "fifth amendment" case from the 
McCarthy-HUAC period that may be worthy of mention-that of 
United Auto Workers organizer John Watkins. Charges of "Fifth 
Amendment Communist" were blackening not only the individuals 
that they were made against but the organizations in which they 
were involved. Walter Reuther, President of the UAW and himself 
a champion of civil liberties, felt duty-bound to inform the entire 
UAW staff that they could not plead the fifth amendment and retain 
their jobs. He promised UAW legal assistance to any staff member 
resisting an investigating committee in other ways. Watkins told 
me he had "wanted to take the Fifth" but needed his job. Ac-
cepting the UAW directive, he told HUAC all about his own Com-
munist activities, but refused to name others without a court order 
directing him to do so. In a landmark opinion by Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, the Supreme Court put strict limits on the activities of con-
gressional investigating committees. It is not unlikely that the Wat-
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kins decision saved many a potential witness from subpoena and the 
obloquy of "Fifth Amendment Communism." 
One final assault on the privilege against self-incrimination-
compelling testimony by grant of immunity from prosecution-has 
current relevance in the Iran-Contra scandal. As Dean Griswold 
pointed out, the Latin maxim for the privilege was, from its incep-
tion, "Nemo tenetur prodere se ipsum"-or, in English, "No one 
should be required to accuse himself." This lends support to those, 
like Justice William 0. Douglas, who argued that the fifth amend-
ment grants a "federally protected right of silence." But that is not 
the law. The Supreme Court has in effect reduced the privilege 
from not having to accuse oneself in a criminal matter to not having 
to give evidence that will help convict oneself. 
One would have thought that, at a minimum, if witnesses are 
to be compelled to testify and accuse themselves under a grant of 
immunity, they would at least receive full immunity from the entire 
matter about which they were compelled to testify ("transactional 
immunity"). Indeed for a long time nothing less than transactional 
immunity was deetned to satisfy the requirements of the fifth 
amendment. But in 1970, as part of the Richard Nixon-John 
Mitchell war on crime, Congress limited immunity to a bar on the 
use of that testimony or evidence derived from it ("use immunity"). 
No matter that the question whether the prosecutor used tainted 
evidence will always be peculiarly within his own knowledge or that 
of some staffer. No matter that the potential defendant will almost 
certainly disclose his defenses during his compelled testimony, 
which will advantage the prosecution in various ways at trial. The 
Supreme Court still could find nothing wrong with compelling testi-
mony from a potential defendant with only a limited grant of immu-
nity to protect his fifth amendment privilege. 
Some of the pro-fifth amendment civil libertarians of the Mc-
Carthy era, rather surprisingly, demanded the compelled testimony 
of John Poindexter and Oliver North. One such civil libertarian, 
himself a liberal former Supreme Court Justice, proposed that Pres-
ident Reagan order the Secretary of the Navy to bring general 
court-martial proceedings against active-duty officers Poindexter 
and North, so that compelled testimony under limited use immu-
nity could be expedited. A leading advocate against McCarthyism 
argued that "the national interest prevails over a soldier's personal 
considerations" so Poindexter and North "have no valid basis other 
than personal advantage for invoking their constitutional privilege." 
Equally surprising, one of the nation's most respected, long-time 
columnists went so far as to suggest a non-immunity "simpler 
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way": Just have the President call in Poindexter and North and 
"ask them for the facts of what they did and who authorized it." 
Independent counsel Lawrence Walsh may have seen the situa-
tion most clearly. His earlier requests for delay in the grant of use 
immunity to North and Poindexter are easily understood; he 
wanted to have his criminal cases buttoned up before immunity be-
came effective. But he went further and argued against the commit-
tees giving the leading figures in the investigation any immunity at 
all and even directed his staff not to watch the hearings. Quite 
likely Walsh sensed the danger that making North and Poindexter 
disclose the facts as they know them, including their defenses, may 
finally be too much for the courts to swallow. After all, no one 
would suggest Walsh could put his case together as he did, and then 
haul North and Poindexter before a grand jury under use immunity. 
Is it really any different if the committees do it for him? Could the 
testimony of North and Poindexter really be totally unknown to 
Walsh and his staff today? Will it remain unknown to them during 
the trials to come? If the national interest supported requiring 
North and Poindexter to testify before the committees, as I believe 
it did, then there is a serious question whether the fifth amendment 
permits them to be tried thereafter. 
The fifth amendment has been the cutting edge of the Bill of 
Rights for two centuries. It is our recognition of the dignity of 
every human being that he need not accuse or incriminate himself 
but rather that the government must prove its case against any ac-
cused, high or low. Though it measures the degree of our civiliza-
tion, the privilege has not always received the support of those who 
purport to hold high the banners of freedom. "It seems to me," as 
it did to Joseph Welch, that bold spirit of the McCarthy era, "in 
this lovely land of ours there is no problem we cannot solve, no 
menace we cannot meet, nor is it in any sense necessary that we 
either surrender or impair any of our ancient, beautiful freedoms." 
